[{"id":"tlsintermediate-001","courseId":"tls-intermediate","domain":"handshake","topic":"EncryptedExtensions right after ServerHello","prompt":"A TLS 1.3 server answers a ClientHello and authenticates itself with a certificate. Put these messages of its reply in the order they are sent.","hint":"Look for the message the spec says comes right after ServerHello.","explain":"A server's reply mixes messages that agree on keys with messages that those keys protect. Consider which messages can be protected at all, and what each one needs in order to be checked.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.4.1","interaction":{"type":"sort","items":[{"text":"ServerHello","why":"The server's first reply; it carries the chosen cipher suite and the server's key share."},{"text":"EncryptedExtensions","why":"Sent immediately after ServerHello, and the first message protected by handshake keys."},{"text":"Certificate","why":"Carries the server's certificate chain, in the authentication messages after the server parameters."},{"text":"CertificateVerify","why":"Signs the handshake so far, and must appear immediately after Certificate."},{"text":"Finished","why":"The last server message: a MAC over the handshake that closes the authentication block."}]},"options":[],"answer":"o:abcde","explanation":"A server sends ServerHello, then EncryptedExtensions immediately. Certificate and CertificateVerify follow, and Finished closes the authentication block.","concept":"A server sends ServerHello, then EncryptedExtensions immediately. Certificate and CertificateVerify follow, and Finished closes the authentication block.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["EncryptedExtensions comes immediately after ServerHello; the authentication block closes the server's flight."]},{"id":"tlsintermediate-002","courseId":"tls-intermediate","domain":"handshake","topic":"key_share generated per group","prompt":"A client builds the key_share extension in its ClientHello. Which TWO statements about its KeyShareEntry values are correct?","hint":"Each entry is one set of key exchange parameters, tied to one group.","explain":"Each key_share entry carries one set of key exchange parameters for one group. Think about how entries must relate to the groups the client advertised, and whether a group can appear twice.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.2.8","interaction":{"type":"multiple","tellCount":true},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"Each entry's key_exchange value is generated independently of the other entries.","why":"The spec requires the key_exchange value of each entry to be generated independently."},{"id":"b","text":"The client must send an entry for every group in supported_groups.","whyNot":"Entries may be a non-contiguous subset and may omit the most preferred groups."},{"id":"c","text":"The client must not offer two entries for the same group.","why":"Two entries for one group are forbidden; the client offers at most one per group."},{"id":"d","text":"Entries must be listed in ascending order of client preference.","whyNot":"The list is in descending order of client preference, most preferred first."},{"id":"e","text":"Entries may name groups that are missing from supported_groups.","whyNot":"A client must not offer entries for groups absent from its supported_groups list."},{"id":"f","text":"The client_shares list must always hold at least one entry.","whyNot":"The list may be empty when the client asks the server to choose a group for it."}],"answer":"ac","explanation":"Each KeyShareEntry is an independent share for one group: values are generated separately, and a group appears at most once in the list.","concept":"Each KeyShareEntry is an independent share for one group: values are generated separately, and a group appears at most once in the list.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A key_share entry is one share for one group, generated separately, with no group repeated."]},{"id":"tlsintermediate-003","courseId":"tls-intermediate","domain":"handshake","topic":"supported_groups extension","prompt":"During a handshake, a client may act on the groups listed in a server's supported_groups extension as soon as it reads them, before the handshake completes.","hint":"Think about what a client should trust before the connection is proven.","explain":"A server can advertise the groups it accepts, which helps a client make better choices later. Consider how much a client should rely on information it has not yet been able to confirm.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.2.7","interaction":{"type":"true-false"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"True","whyNot":"Clients MUST NOT act on information in supported_groups before the handshake completes successfully."},{"id":"b","text":"False","why":"The client must wait for successful completion; only then may it change the groups it uses in later connections."}],"answer":"b","explanation":"A server's supported_groups list is advisory: clients must not act on it until the handshake has successfully completed, and may use it in later connections.","concept":"A server's supported_groups list is advisory: clients must not act on it until the handshake has successfully completed, and may use it in later connections.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A server's supported_groups list is advisory until the handshake completes successfully."]},{"id":"tlsintermediate-004","courseId":"tls-intermediate","domain":"handshake","topic":"signature_algorithms for certificate authentication","prompt":"A client gets a certificate chain from a server but cannot build an acceptable chain from the certificates it was given. It decides to abort. Which alert does it send by default?","hint":"The alert named is specific to certificates, not a general failure.","explain":"Certificate chains are checked against the signature algorithms the client advertised. When a client cannot make a usable chain from what it received, the protocol defines a specific way to report that.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.2.3","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"unsupported_certificate","why":"That is the default alert a client sends when it aborts because no acceptable chain can be built."},{"id":"b","text":"handshake_failure","whyNot":"A generic alert for failed parameter negotiation; the default for this case is certificate-specific."},{"id":"c","text":"certificate_required","whyNot":"A server sends this when a client supplies no certificate; it does not describe a client's own unusable chain."},{"id":"d","text":"No alert; the client just closes the TCP connection","whyNot":"If the client aborts, it MUST abort with an appropriate certificate-related alert, not close silently."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"If a client cannot build an acceptable certificate chain and decides to abort, it sends a certificate-related alert, by default unsupported_certificate.","concept":"If a client cannot build an acceptable certificate chain and decides to abort, it sends a certificate-related alert, by default unsupported_certificate.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["An unusable server chain gets a certificate-specific alert, by default unsupported_certificate."]},{"id":"tlsintermediate-005","courseId":"tls-intermediate","domain":"handshake","topic":"Hello Retry Request trigger","prompt":"A client's ClientHello offers a key_share only for x25519. The server would accept the connection but wants secp256r1, which the client listed and sent no share for. What does the server send next?","hint":"The server needs something from the client before it can finish key exchange.","explain":"A server may find settings it can accept and still be unable to finish, because the first message lacks needed material. Think about how a server can get that material without rejecting the connection.","source":"https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446.html#section-4.1.4","interaction":{"type":"single"},"options":[{"id":"a","text":"A HelloRetryRequest asking for a new key_share","why":"The server replies with a HelloRetryRequest, telling the client which group it needs a share for."},{"id":"b","text":"A ServerHello carrying a secp256r1 key_share anyway","whyNot":"The server cannot complete the key exchange in a group the client sent no share for."},{"id":"c","text":"A fatal handshake_failure alert right away","whyNot":"That alert is for when the two sides share no usable group at all, and here they do."},{"id":"d","text":"A NewSessionTicket with the retry parameters","whyNot":"NewSessionTicket is a post-handshake message and cannot negotiate parameters."}],"answer":"a","explanation":"When the server can pick acceptable parameters but the ClientHello lacks the information to proceed, it sends HelloRetryRequest; a missing key_share for the chosen group is one such case.","concept":"When the server can pick acceptable parameters but the ClientHello lacks the information to proceed, it sends HelloRetryRequest; a missing key_share for the chosen group is one such case.","rev":1,"updatedAt":"2026-10-26","kind":"scenario","takeaways":["A missing key_share for a group the server picks leads to a HelloRetryRequest."]}]